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In the immediate aftermath of the general election the Independent ran a whole-page headline illustrated with contrasting graphics showing 'What we voted for' and 'What we got', followed up by '…and why it's time for change'.
1 The paper launched a petition calling for a shift to a system that is fairer and more proportional, which in rapid time attracted tens of thousands of signatories, initially at a rate of more than 500 people a day. These developments highlighted the extent to which the plurality rule voting system for general elections (also still used for council elections in England and Wales) itself became an election issue. During the campaign itself the normal bi-polarizing statements from Labour and Conservative politicians proclaiming a 'straight choice' between them were typically no sooner issued that drowned out in a chorus of dissent. The Guardian featured a prominent campaign by Polly Toynbee for readers to voter Labour with the aid of a clothes peg, symbolizing distaste for the Hobson's choice of either supporting a government with disliked policies like the invasion of Iraq, or voting for other parties and possibly 'letting in' the Conservatives (with more disliked policies, notably on immigration). 2 The corollary of accepting the clothes peg was said to be a vigorous post-election campaign to make 2005 the last plurality rule general election.
3
The 2005 result offered some further significant pointers also to how the problem of achieving change in the election system might work itself out. Josep Colomer has recently argued that there is no evidence to support 'Duverger's law' that plurality rule systems induce a smaller number of parties. 4 Rather he argues that when the number of parties in a system decisively increases above two or three, so the risks for established parties of power increase that they will do badly under the increasingly chaotic results that plurality rule often generates with multiple parties. At this point and this point only, when the number of parties in a system has already increased, Colomer argues, incumbent major party elites will be willing to move to a more proportional system as a defensive move, to safeguard their position against losing out catastrophically. Thus the number of parties typically shows no further change once proportional representation (PR) is introduced, because only the prior decisive advent of multi-party politics can trigger this kind of electoral system being conceded by self-interested elites. We have argued elsewhere that the UK is already in the process of a prolonged transition to PR, marked by the 'co-existence' of PR and plurality rule election systems, within which there has been a gradual transition to proportional systems. 5 The latest increment in this process is the advent of single transferable vote (STV) for
Scottish local elections and the next increment might well be the concession of PR elections for choosing at least a majority of members of the House of Lords. To assess how far this process was advanced or not by the general election we focus on three different dimensions of electoral system effects: (1) changes in the number of parties competing; (2) the proportionality of the electoral system; and (3) some continuing strengths of the current system.
Most of the analysis here focuses on the regional level, which may seem a rather strange thing to do, because regions play no formal role in plurality rule elections. However, regional results allow us to explore the diversity of plurality rule operations, which is rarely what it seems from national level data. In particular, from an 'experiential' point of view the most important aspect of electoral systems' operations is how they feel to voters. In this sense an experiential approach contrast strongly with the more conventional, 'institutionalist' approach. 6 Strictly speaking the optimal way of assessing experiential effects would be to map most individual voters' area of reference, the space that they consider 'around here' for themselves, and then to assess how the voting system operated within the majority perceptions of this localized 'region', whose extent might vary considerably from one constituency or region to another. The data demands of this approach are heavy, however, and we lack the key data on voters' perceptions needed to operationalize it. The regional data considered here are clunky and inadequate by comparison, but they do at least address The indicator most widely used to capture the weighted importance of different parties in competition is ENP, the effective number of parties. The core idea here is to take account of all the parties in competition but weight them in relation to their size, so that in arriving at an overall number of parties estimate we weight larger parties more than smaller ones. This national score is misleading, however, because the picture at individual region level is much worse, and some of these differences are blurred by aggregation to national level. All but three regions (the south west, London and east midlands) have RRP scores above two fifths, and the top four regions in Table 3 have astonishingly high levels above 50 per centwhich means that more than half the voters' choice set in these areas is ignored in allocating seats.
-- Table 3 about here --
The Disproportionality of the Voting System
The main measure of disproportionality has been to compute measures of deviation from pure proportionality in the allocation of seats to parties. proportionality' (or ADV score). 15 This measure takes into account the initial size of the largest party's vote, which limits the scope for deviations from proportionality caused by 'leader's bias'. The ADV measure starts at zero but reaches 100 when the largest party wins all the seats available, whatever vote share it obtains. This is a relevant point to define a ceiling because if a polity goes across this line (for example, to 110 per cent) then we cannot regard it as any kind of democracy. But a polity that has an ADV score of 100 is still (just) within the liberal democratic fold. 16 In Research we conducted for the Commission suggested that this system would be broadly proportional. 19 However, subsequent experience with British AMS systems has shown that the release from the constraint of plurality rule encourages the display of broader range of party preferences and by somewhat increasing the proportion of small party votes raises the DV scores for the existing British AMS systems. We have concluded accordingly that it now seems highly unlikely that a Jenkins solution could deliver broad proportionality and that a larger proportion of top-up seats is almost certain to be required. 20 In Table 4 below we accordingly show data for the original Jenkins solution and a more generous 75 per cent local and 25 per cent top-up seats solution, which we now think is likely to be the minimum top-up seats needed for broad proportionality.
We also show for comparison the seats distributions resulting from a 'pure' AMS system on German or New Zealand lines, with a 50:50 local/top-up seats split. There is an additional methodological reason for including this information, namely that the simulation carried out here is a pretty rough and ready one. We have essentially paired up existing constituencies (with one or two cases of triple constituencies) across the country, so as to create 50 per cent of spare seats. These can then be allocated in county-level top-up areas, in line with the Jenkins Commission recommendation that top-up areas should be localized well below the regional level. 21 We have then essentially interpolated the 75:25 and 83:17 results by assuming a smoothly operating transition from the 50:50 solution (that we have defined) to the 100 per cent local seats general election result. Some anomalies are inevitably thrown up by this interpolation process, which we have 'hand-corrected'. This is a labour-intensive process and it produces results which need to be interpreted with some caution. But simulation predictions using this approach have modeled the existing British AMS elections relatively well, once we control for changes in voting behaviour under PR, which of course cannot be fully anticipated in advance. 22 We should also note two further limitations of the AMS results below. First, British AMS systems all give citizens two votes, one for the local and for the top-up contests. In Scotland and Wales around a quarter of voters split their two votes and in London approaching a third do so across more choices, reflecting the increasingly conditional character of modern voters' party attachments. 23 We cannot reproduce the two-vote effect here, but must rely on reaggregating local votes at the top-up level. Second, the Jenkins Commission's recommended system was Alternative Vote-plus, since it combined a small proportion of top-up seats with a shift towards using the alternative vote in the local seats. So in Table 4 our AMS solution assumes only plurality rule local contests, since we do not have multi-preference data.
(However, we can say from past work that the effect of AV in the Jenkins scheme is likely to be fairly predictable, cutting Tory seats by about a dozen and with labour and the Liberal Democrats roughly equal beneficiaries, as tactical voting between the two parties' supporters is somewhat facilitated).
-- Table 4 here --The key result from Table 4 Finally on simulations the detailed tables in Annex 1, from which Table 4 So how strongly embedded is plurality rule in the UK? There are some aspects of the system that tend to prop up its effectiveness, including for instance the fact that national DV scores are significantly below regional ones, as offsetting pro-Labour and pro-Conservative biases cancel each other out. In addition, as Table 5 below shows the electoral system in Great
Britain still confers a degree of influence on their representation that spans somewhat beyond the supporters of the largest or governing party alone. Here we examine whether people got the result that they wanted nationally, in terms of the party they voted for controlling government, or locally, in terms of the party they backed successfully electing the local MP.
We also include as successful those people who voted for a party that emerged as preponderant in the region where they live, whether or not that party won their local seat. A 'triple winner' in Table 5 other party voters were even double winners, but some were single winners at the local constituency level.
-- Table 5 
Conclusions
The dialectic of electoral reform in the UK is a subtle and long-run one. A chaining of differently-aligned developments contributes an overall momentum towards broader multi- Notes: The number of GB votes is rounded to the nearest hundred. The regional ranking scores derive from the fourth column of Table 2 below. We assign four points for a regional first place, three points for second place, two points for third place and one point for coming fourth. 
